Abstract This essay traces the historical evolution of "direct calls" (chiamate dirette) for the recruitment of university professors in Italy, framing them within the broader and persistent tension between political power and academic autonomy. Starting from the Casati Law of 1859 — which already provided for ministerial appointment of ordinary professors "by clear fame" alongside competitive selection — the author follows the trajectory of this exceptional recruitment channel through the Fascist regime (when the De Vecchi and Bottai decrees turned chairs into political rewards, as Calamandrei vividly denounced), the post-war controversies over the so-called "Gonella professors", and the Republican legislation that, despite Article 97 of the Constitution, preserved and progressively expanded the use of direct calls under various forms (Presidential Decree 382/1980, Law 127/1997, Law 230/2005, Law 240/2010, and the recruitment scheme of the Scuola superiore dell'economia e delle finanze). Particular attention is devoted to the so-called "Natta Chairs" introduced by the 2016 Stability Law (Article 1, paragraphs 207–212), which establish a parallel recruitment channel financed by a special fund, governed by a Prime Ministerial Decree rather than by university-system sources, and based on commissions appointed without meaningful involvement of the academic community. The author highlights serious concerns regarding constitutional compatibility with the principle of university autonomy (Article 33 of the Constitution), the vagueness of the criteria for assessing "excellence", the questionable use of ERC sectors aggregating heterogeneous scientific-disciplinary fields, the differentiated treatment of recruited professors (higher salary classes, portability of resources), and the absence of any ex post evaluation mechanism. The essay concludes that this "regime of specialty" — with its special selections, special funding and special legal status — risks creating a parallel and privileged track of academic recruitment, undermining the systemic and cultural unity and independence of the Italian university.

Le (molteplici) chiamate dirette dei docenti universitari: prime riflessioni sulle c.d. Cattedre Natta

GIANI, LOREDANA
2016-01-01

Abstract

Abstract This essay traces the historical evolution of "direct calls" (chiamate dirette) for the recruitment of university professors in Italy, framing them within the broader and persistent tension between political power and academic autonomy. Starting from the Casati Law of 1859 — which already provided for ministerial appointment of ordinary professors "by clear fame" alongside competitive selection — the author follows the trajectory of this exceptional recruitment channel through the Fascist regime (when the De Vecchi and Bottai decrees turned chairs into political rewards, as Calamandrei vividly denounced), the post-war controversies over the so-called "Gonella professors", and the Republican legislation that, despite Article 97 of the Constitution, preserved and progressively expanded the use of direct calls under various forms (Presidential Decree 382/1980, Law 127/1997, Law 230/2005, Law 240/2010, and the recruitment scheme of the Scuola superiore dell'economia e delle finanze). Particular attention is devoted to the so-called "Natta Chairs" introduced by the 2016 Stability Law (Article 1, paragraphs 207–212), which establish a parallel recruitment channel financed by a special fund, governed by a Prime Ministerial Decree rather than by university-system sources, and based on commissions appointed without meaningful involvement of the academic community. The author highlights serious concerns regarding constitutional compatibility with the principle of university autonomy (Article 33 of the Constitution), the vagueness of the criteria for assessing "excellence", the questionable use of ERC sectors aggregating heterogeneous scientific-disciplinary fields, the differentiated treatment of recruited professors (higher salary classes, portability of resources), and the absence of any ex post evaluation mechanism. The essay concludes that this "regime of specialty" — with its special selections, special funding and special legal status — risks creating a parallel and privileged track of academic recruitment, undermining the systemic and cultural unity and independence of the Italian university.
2016
university recruitment, direct calls, Natta Chairs, university autonomy, academic excellence
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14092/1656
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