This paper contributes to the literature on market cooperation. It draws on influential works from this field in order to support the presentation of a theoretical model in conjunction with a mathematical formulation. The model represents a synthesis of the ideas and concepts discussed, and act as a focus for subsequent discussion. The mathematical formulation aims to shed light on the possibility that features of the interaction patterns in conjunction with prior exchange history may promote inter-firm cooperation. Non- cooperative game theory provides the theoretical foundation for the analysis. The mathematical formulation examines two different contexts: game with Perfect Monitoring and game with Imperfect Monitoring.

This paper contributes to the literature on market cooperation. It draws on influential works from this field in order to support the presentation of a theoretical model in conjunction with a mathematical formulation. The model represents a synthesis of the ideas and concepts discussed, and act as a focus for subsequent discussion. The mathematical formulation aims to shed light on the possibility that features of the interaction patterns in conjunction with prior exchange history may promote inter-firm cooperation. Non-cooperative game theory provides the theoretical foundation for the analysis. The mathematical formulation examines two different contexts: game with Perfect Monitoring and game with Imperfect Monitoring.

A game-theory perspective on market cooperation

DELBUFALO E;MONSURRO' Marina
2014-01-01

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on market cooperation. It draws on influential works from this field in order to support the presentation of a theoretical model in conjunction with a mathematical formulation. The model represents a synthesis of the ideas and concepts discussed, and act as a focus for subsequent discussion. The mathematical formulation aims to shed light on the possibility that features of the interaction patterns in conjunction with prior exchange history may promote inter-firm cooperation. Non- cooperative game theory provides the theoretical foundation for the analysis. The mathematical formulation examines two different contexts: game with Perfect Monitoring and game with Imperfect Monitoring.
2014
This paper contributes to the literature on market cooperation. It draws on influential works from this field in order to support the presentation of a theoretical model in conjunction with a mathematical formulation. The model represents a synthesis of the ideas and concepts discussed, and act as a focus for subsequent discussion. The mathematical formulation aims to shed light on the possibility that features of the interaction patterns in conjunction with prior exchange history may promote inter-firm cooperation. Non-cooperative game theory provides the theoretical foundation for the analysis. The mathematical formulation examines two different contexts: game with Perfect Monitoring and game with Imperfect Monitoring.
game theory
inter firm cooperation
perfect and imperfect monitoring
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14092/2891
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